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Abstract
We develop an informational theory of dictatorship. Dictators survive not because of their use of
force or ideology but because they convince the public—rightly or wrongly—that they are competent.
Citizens do not observe the dictator’s type but infer it from signals inherent in their living standards,
state propaganda, and messages sent by an informed elite via independent media. If citizens conclude
the dictator is incompetent, they overthrow him in a revolution. The dictator can invest in making
convincing state propaganda, censoring independent media, coopting the elite, or equipping police to
repress attempted uprisings—but he must finance such spending with taxes that depress the public’s
living standards. We show that incompetent dictators can survive as long as economic shocks are not too
large. Moreover, their reputations for competence may grow over time. Censorship and co-optation of
the elite are substitutes, but both are complements of propaganda. Repression of protests is a substitute
for all the other techniques. In some equilibria the ruler uses propaganda and coopts the elite; in others,
propaganda is combined with censorship. The multiplicity of equilibria emerges due to coordination
failure among members of the elite. We show that repression is used against ordinary citizens only as
a last resort when the opportunities to survive through co-optation, censorship, and propaganda are
exhausted. In the equilibrium with censorship, difficult economic times prompt higher relative spending
on censorship and propaganda. The results illuminate tradeoffs faced by various recent dictatorships.
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1 Introduction
How do dictators hold onto power? The totalitarian tyrannies of Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, and others
relied largely—although not exclusively—on mass terror and indoctrination. Although less ideological, many
20th Century military regimes—from Franco’s Spain to Pinochet’s Chile—used considerable violence to
intimidate opponents of the regime.1 However, in recent decades, a less carnivorous form of authoritarian
rule has emerged, one better adapted to the globalized media and sophisticated technologies of the 21st
Century. From the Peru of Alberto Fujimori to the Hungary of Viktor Orban, illiberal regimes have managed
to consolidate power without isolating their countries from the world economy or resorting to mass killings.
Instead of inaugurating “new orders,” such regimes simulate democracy, holding elections that they make
sure to win, bribing and censoring the private press rather than abolishing it, and replacing ideology with an
amorphous anti-Western resentment.2 Their leaders often enjoy genuine popularity—albeit after eliminating
plausible rivals—that is based on “performance legitimacy,” a perceived competence at securing prosperity
and defending the nation against external threats. State propaganda aims not to re-engineer human souls but
to boost the leader’s ratings, which, so long as they remain high, are widely publicized. Political opponents
are harassed and humiliated, accused of fabricated crimes, and encouraged to emigrate.
The new-style dictators can brutally crush separatist rebellions and deploy paramilitaries against unarmed
protesters. But compared to previous regimes, they use violence sparingly. They prefer the ankle bracelet to
the Gulag. Maintaining power, for them, is less a matter of terrorizing victims than of manipulating beliefs
about the world. Of course, shaping beliefs was also important for the old-style dictatorships, but violence
came first. “Words are fine things, but muskets are even better,” Mussolini quipped (Odegard 1935, p.261).
Recent tyrannies reverse the order. “We live on information,” Fujimori’s security chief Vladimir Montesinos
confessed in one interview. “The addiction to information is like an addiction to drugs.” Montesinos paid
million dollar bribes to television stations to skew their coverage. But killing members of the elite struck
him as foolish: “Remember why Pinochet had his problems. We will not be so clumsy”(McMillan and Zoido
2004, p.74). When dictators are accused of political murders these days, it often augurs the fall of the
dictatorship.
Of course, some bloody military regimes and totalitarian states remain—for instance, in Egypt and
Syria, or North Korea—but the balance has shifted. As Table 1 shows, far more of the undemocratic
orders around today have elected legislatures in which non-government parties occupy a significant place.
And fewer are currently involved in mass atrocities against their populations. Besides Fujimori’s Peru and
Orban’s Hungary, other regimes that share some or all of these characteristics include Vladimir Putin’s
Russia, Mahathir Mohamad’s Malaysia, and Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey. One might even see Lee Kuan
1More than 30,000 people are believed to have been killed by Pinochet’s agents, “most of them taken away to secret detention
centers and camps, tortured, tossed still alive from airplanes into the sea or shot and buried in unmarked graves” (Roht-Arriaza
2005, p.viii).
2On the use of elections and partially democratic or pseudo-democratic institutions in dictatorships, see Gandhi (2008),
Gandhi and Lust-Okar (2009) and Levitsky and Way (2010). Although our focus is on “dictatorships,” which we see as synony-
mous with “authoritarian regimes,” we consider the dividing line between soft authoritarian regimes and illiberal democracies
to be a fuzzy one. The model also applies to most illiberal democracies.
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Table 1: Changing characteristics of non-democracies, 1980-2012.
Percent with
ongoing mass killings
Percent with
no elected legislature
Percent with legislatures
where government parties have
more than 95 percent of seats
1980 22 33 70
2012 6 15 35
Sources: Database of Political Institutions 2010 (see Beck et al. 2001); Polity
IV database; Mass Killings Database (see Ulfelder and Valentino 2008, and updated
data at https://dartthrowingchimp.wordpress.com/2013/07/25/trends-over-time-in-state-
sponsored-mass-killing/).
Notes: “Non-democracies” are countries with Polity2 scores of less than 6. A “mass killing”
is “any event in which the actions of state agents result in the intentional death of at least
1,000 noncombatants from a discrete group in a period of sustained violence.”
Yew’s Singapore as a pioneer of such soft autocracy.
We develop a model of dictatorship to capture the logic that governs the survival of such regimes. As in
“career concerns” models of democratic politics, the ruler may be either competent or incompetent.3 Only
the dictator and a subset of the public—“the informed elite”—observe his type directly. But citizens update
their beliefs about this based on the information available to them from the state media, independent media,
and their own living standards. Citizens’ living standards depend on the tax rate set by the dictator and on
economic performance, itself a function of the leader’s competence and a stochastic shock. If enough citizens
infer, based on these various signals, that the incumbent is incompetent, they rise up and overthrow him in
a revolution. Members of the elite—if not coopted—would also prefer to replace an incompetent incumbent
but cannot do so without the masses to back them up.4
The dictator can affect all the channels of information. He can invest in making the propaganda broadcast
via state media more convincing. He can bribe (or impose costs—such as fines or violence—on) the informed
elite to prevent the latter from sending critical messages. And he can censor those messages that they do
send. The dictator can also invest in equipping the police with the tools of repression, thus increasing the cost
of revolution. However, all these actions require money, which must come from taxing the citizens, depressing
their living standards, and indirectly lowering their estimate of his competence. Hence the tradeoff.
We show how the dictator’s strategy, and his equilibrium survival odds, as well as the path of citizens’
beliefs, change with the various exogenous parameters—the size of the stochastic shocks, the distribution of
competence, and the technology of censorship, propaganda, and repression. We identify two equilibria—in
one the dictator coopts the elite, in the other he censors the private media. Multiple equilibria exist because
members of the elite must coordinate on a strategy. When both equilibria exist, the one with co-optation
3Competence here refers to the ability to promote—or at least not undermine—economic growth and defend the country
against external threats. The contrast between the rapid, sustained growth in the Singapore of Lee Kuan Yew and the consistent
economic decline in the Zaire of Sese Seko Mobutu suggests that some dictators may indeed be more competent than others.
4Leaders of authoritarian states are more often removed by coups than by mass uprisings (Geddes 1999), but we focus here
on regime change, which is less frequent than leader turnover.
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always yields the dictator higher survival odds than the one with censorship. Force is used against the
general public only as a last resort after co-optation, censorship, and propaganda have failed.
The model offers insight into a number of observations and puzzles about the functioning of dictatorships.
First, it shows how modern autocracies can survive while employing relatively little violence against the
public. Repression is not necessary if mass beliefs can be manipulated sufficiently by means of censorship,
co-optation, and propaganda. Indeed, since in our model major repression is only used if equilibria based on
co-optation and censorship have disappeared, violence signals to the opposition and the general public that
the regime is incompetent and therefore vulnerable.
Second, the effectiveness of propaganda in authoritarian regimes is a prima facie puzzle. Given that
citizens know the dictator has an incentive to lie about his type, why do they ever listen? In our model,
propaganda works because whereas competent leaders can costlessly show themselves to be competent,
incompetent ones must invest resources to fake the evidence that will make this claim convincing—and
sometimes they choose to spend their budget on other actions instead. Thus, observing a dictator claim
convincingly to be competent increases the odds that he actually is—especially given the resources he could
shift from propaganda to consumption and public goods which are directly observed by the public.
Third, why do some clearly incompetent dictators nevertheless hold on to power for long periods? The
model shows how rulers whom most or all citizens—if fully informed—would prefer to overthrow can still
survive in many circumstances simply by manipulating information. And we focus on a mechanism other
than the well-studied one of blocking communication among potential protesters. The dictator’s survival
depends here not on preventing citizens from expressing their willingness to rebel (in our model, we abstract
from the issue of coordination among the protesters), but on manipulating public beliefs about the state of
the world and the incumbent’s type.
Moreover, we show that over time incompetent leaders, if they survive, may acquire a reputation for
competence as a result of rational Bayesian updating by citizens. Such reputations can withstand temporary
economic dowturns if these are not too large. This is consistent with the empirical finding that dictators
that last through their first few years are less likely to be overthrown (Svolik 2009, Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2010, Treisman 2014). However, the mechanism we propose here—of consistent but incorrect citizen
updating about the leader’s type—differs from those of Svolik (2009), who emphasizes power consolidation
by the incumbent, and Treisman (2014), who emphasizes selection effects.
Fourth, the multiple equilibria associated with different leader strategies illuminate why, among dictator-
ships that seem otherwise quite similar, some focus on censoring independent media while others censor much
less but coopt the elite with patronage. For example, while Iran has the world’s strictest limits on internet
content, according to Freedom House, Morocco has among the least restrictive internet controls, on a par
with those of Japan (Freedom House 2013). The Moroccan royal family has consistently viewed co-optation
“as a much more effective tool than confrontation and repression,” given the country’s traditional system in
which “patronage and accommodation were deeply ingrained” (Willis 2014, p.444).
Fifth, the model predicts that as economic conditions worsen, a dictatorship may switch to using cen-
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sorship in place of co-optation of the elite, and boost relative spending on censorship and propaganda. This
is consistent with a noted increase since the global financial crisis in efforts to block and limit opposition
media in a range of countries, from Hungary and Turkey to Russia. As Turkey’s growth rate fell from 7.8
percent in 2010 to 0.8 percent in 2012, the number of journalists in jail increased from four to 49.5 Between
2008 and 2011, Hungary fell 15 percentage points on Freedom House’s press freedom index. Conversely, the
result makes sense of the increasing focus on co-optation in China during its long period of rapid growth.
Starting in the 1980s, Beijing replaced the Mao-era system of total control with one that relied increasingly
on commercialized self-censorship; media owners, editors, and journalists are rewarded for loyalty with state
advertising contracts and well-paid jobs, thus incentivizing them to censor themselves. “The desire to win
performance bonuses tends to result in journalism that steers well clear of dangerous political controversy and
meets the party’s propaganda requirements,” according to one analyst (Esarey 2005, pp.57-9). Censorship
of the internet, meanwhile, has focused on blocking collective action rather than on suppressing criticism of
the government and party (King, Pan, and Roberts 2013). In Singapore as well, “forsaken profits and stiff
legal penalties have been more effective in fostering self-censorship than earlier methods of intimidation”
(Rodan 1998, p.69).
Seventh, the model offers a variety of reasons why—as widely noted—modernization makes dictatorship
harder to sustain, at least in the absence of vast resource rents. By increasing the size of the “informed
elite,” economic development increases the cost for incompetent dictators of either coopting potential critics
or censoring their media messages. Even relatively small economic shocks then become sufficient to threaten
the incumbent’s rule. If modernization also increases the technological sophistication of opposition media,
then censorship may fail for this reason as well.
We develop the model assuming the simplest, linear technologies for propaganda, censorship, co-optation,
and repression. This allows us to study the complementarities that arise due to the inference problem of
citizens. We point out that propaganda (positive reports by the leader about his competence) is comple-
mentary to both the co-optation of the informed elite and the censorship of independent media, both of
which are techniques that aim to prevent news of the incumbent’s incompetence from getting out. Cen-
sorship and co-optation are substitutes. Repression against potential revolutionaries is a substitute for all
the information-based techniques for maintaining power. Under some parameter values, equilibria exist in
which no repression against the public is needed at all. Under other parameter values for which there are no
equilibria based on co-optation, censorship, or propaganda, an equilibrium based on repression of potential
protests may exist. To focus on the less studied aspects of the problem, we assume the uninformed public is
homogeneous and we do not examine the problem of coordination among protesters. For treatments of this,
see Edmond (2014) and Lohmann (1994).
The next section reviews related literature. Section 3 outlines the elements of the model. Section 4
derives the equilibria. Sections 5 and 6 discuss comparative statics and several extensions, including a
dynamic version of the game and one with continuous economic shocks. Section 7 concludes.
5Data from the Committee to Protect Journalists, https://www.cpj.org/imprisoned/2014.php.
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2 Literature
Wintrobe (1990) pioneered the formal analysis of dictators’ behavior, modeling, in a reduced form, decision-
theoretic framework, the tradeoff between investing in repression and coopting citizens with material benefits.
He examined the choices of two types of dictators—“totalitarians,” who maximized power, and “tin-pot”
dictators, who maximized their own consumption subject to a minimum power constraint. In Wintrobe
(2007), he generalized the dictator’s objective function to include both power and consumption, allowing the
equilibrium levels to be determined by cost parameters.
Subsequent formal analyses of dictatorship focused on several different— although related—questions.
One set of works considered the economic policies autocrats would choose and how these compare to those
prevailing under either anarchy or democracy. Olson (1993) argued that dictators’ incentives to adopt
growth-promoting policies depend on their time horizon and how encompassing an interest they have in
national output.
A second direction of research examined the role of institutions in authoritarian states, interpreting
them as mechanisms by which the ruler solved time inconsistency problems. By creating institutions that
constrained him in the short run, a dictator could enable himself to commit credibly to certain policies—
repaying state debts and respecting property rights (North and Weingast 1989, Gehlbach and Keefer 2011),
redistributing income to the poor (Boix 2003, Acemoglu and Robinson 2006), or sharing power with members
of his ruling group (Myerson 2008, Svolik 2012, Boix and Svolik 2013). Models showed how such credible
commitments could increase borrowing power and private investment in the first case, prevent revolutions
in the second, and avoid coups or elite defection in the third.
Another literature models the relationship between dictators and their support group when such inter-
actions are not mediated by institutions. These works examine how the dictator chooses the number and
characteristics of his inner circle (Egorov and Sonin 2011, Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2003).
A fourth set of works analyzes the effects of information problems under dictatorship. By monopolizing
the media and criminalizing dissent, rulers are assumed to prevent citizens from sharing information. Some
papers in this set have explored how costly protest actions by individuals communicate facts to other individ-
uals, triggering—or failing to trigger—informational cascades (Kuran 1991, Lohmann 1994). The greater is
the repression, the less likely are protests to occur, but the greater is the discontent that they communicate
if they do (Kricheli et al. 2011). Dagaev et al (2013) examine how new information technologies facilitate
coordination by potential opponents of a regime.
A few papers explore more complicated ways, in which dictators may seek to manipulate the information
environment. Egorov, Guriev, and Sonin (2009) and Lorentzen (2014) model the tradeoff for a dictator in
setting the level of censorship, where a free media, on the one hand, provides the information necessary for
the dictator to discipline his bureaucrats, but, on the other hand, assists the expression and coordination
of opposition. Edmond (2013) examines the strategic use of propaganda. In his game, citizens want to
overthrow an existing regime but are imperfectly informed about the regime’s “strength.” The ruler sends
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costly, biased signals about the regime’s strength in the attempt to prevent citizens from coordinating
against him. Citizens, although understanding the ruler’s incentive to deceive, cannot fully separate the
true information from the bias. In this sense, propaganda can work in equilibrium, and it is more effective,
the more precise are the signals. Huang (2014) also models state propaganda as the sending of signals of
repressive capacity.6 In his model, the content of the message is irrelevant; what constitutes the signal is the
amount of propaganda sent, which citizens are assumed to observe. His key assumption is that the capacity
to broadcast propaganda and the capacity to repress rebellions are correlated, so more propaganda signals
greater repressive capacity.
Our model explores the tradeoffs for rulers who choose a portfolio of techniques—censorship, propaganda,
co-optation, and repression—to preserve their power. Our approach differs from those of Edmond and Huang
in that our incumbents vary in “competence,” whereas their incumbents vary in “strength,” understood as
the ability to repress mass protests. (In our model, as in Edmond’s, the “incompetent”/“weak” leaders try
to pool with the “competent”/“strong” ones and are able to do so in some states of the world.) Neither
paper considers censorship of private messages or the tradeoffs between propaganda, censorship, and positive
and negative rewards. They focus on the way flows of information among the mass public influence protest.
We bracket this question in order to explore the game between the dictator and the “informed elite” over
propaganda, private media messages, and censorship.
3 Setting
3.1 Players
There is a dictator and a continuum of citizens of unit mass. The citizens are exogenously divided into
informed (elite) and uninformed (general public). The mass of informed citizens, I, is small (so the elite
cannot overthrow the dictator by themselves; the general public can). Citizens maximize their current
consumption plus the net present value of future consumption.
The dictator receives an exogenous rent each period he remains in power. He maximizes the net present
value of expected future rents. In a one-period version of the model, the dictator simply maximizes the
probability of staying in power pi.
All agents are risk-neutral but also have limited liability (i.e. cannot pay large fines).
3.2 Timing
1. The dictator learns his type θ ∈ {0, 1}. Nature picks I citizens who observe the type of the dictator,
θ. Both the informed citizens and the dictator observe the realization of economic output, Y .
6Propaganda may also feature as part of loyalty rituals in authoritarian states—the leader’s ability to get citizens to repeat
the propaganda shows the extent of his political control, deterring challenges, as discussed in many analyses of totalitarian
regimes. We abstract from such loyalty rituals here in order to focus on the type of state propaganda that aims to influence
citizens’ beliefs about the competence of the ruler (at providing economic or security benefits).
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2. The dictator chooses the level of censorship, x ∈ [0, 1]. The dictator offers a level of rewards, r, to
members of the elite who commit not to send anti-regime messages. The dictator chooses a level of
investment in propaganda, P .
3. The informed citizens choose whether (i) to support the regime and receive the reward, r, or (ii) to
join the opposition and to send a signal to the public. The share of those who support the regime is
α; the share of those who join the opposition is β = 1− α.
4. Contracts for the elite are implemented. Censorship blocks x per cent of the independent signals, so
the public receives the opposition’s signals with probability (1− x)β. Payoffs are realized.
5. Citizens observe their consumption, C, propaganda signal, p = {0, 1}, and any independent signals
that get through censorship, z = {0, 1}. The citizens update their beliefs about θ and decide whether
to overthrow the dictator.
3.3 The economy
Total output (GDP), Y , may take two values: Y L and Y H , where ∆Y ≡ Y H − Y L > 0. The probability ξθ
of the high state, Y = Y H , depends on the quality of the dictator, θ.
For simplicity, we assume that θ can take two values: θ = 0 (the dictator is incompetent) and θ = 1 (the
dictator is competent). The dictator is competent with probability θ¯ (the parameter θ¯ is therefore also the
expected value of θ).
The probability ξθ of the high output Y = Y
H is higher if the dictator is competent:
ξ1 > ξ0.
The dictator can use part of GDP for funding propaganda, P , censorship, X, and for rewarding the elites,
R. His budget constraint is Y = C + P + X + R, where C is consumed by the population. For simplicity,
we assume that C is distributed equally among citizens—so C is also per capita consumption, since the
number of citizens is normalized to 1—and is observed by all. By contrast, we assume that Y , X, P , and
R are not observed by the general public. Y may include both official and unofficial income sources, while
C may include consumption by citizens of both private goods and non-excludable public goods provided by
the government.
By spending P on propaganda, the dictator increases the probability that the public gets a convincing
propaganda message: p = 1. (The content of the message is: “the dictator is competent, θ = 1”; the value
of p indicates whether it is convincing or not.) We assume that the competent dictator can send the signal
p = 1 costlessly. If the dictator is incompetent, the probability of public getting the positive message p = 1
is
Λ(P ) = min
{
P
P̂
, 1
}
. (1)
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Here P̂ is a parameter that represents the cost to an incompetent dictator of generating fully convincing
propaganda.
By spending X on censorship, the dictator blocks x per cent of the opposition’s messages:
x = min
{
X
βX̂
, 1
}
.
Here X̂ is a cost parameter that captures how much it costs to block all the messages if all informed citizens
join the opposition.
The co-optation of the elites works as follows: the dictator pays r to each informed citizen if the citizen
does not send negative messages. The total cost of rewarding the elites is R = rαI; both α and r are
endogenously determined in equilibrium.
3.4 Information
There are four kinds of signals in the model. First, each informed citizen learns the type of the dictator,
θ, and GDP, Y , precisely. Second, all citizens observe per capita consumption, C. Third, the dictator
disseminates propaganda—which is a public signal, p = {0, 1}, received by every citizen. Given that the
competent dictator can send p = 1 at no cost, he always does so. Therefore if the public observes p = 0, it
knows with certainty that the dictator is incompetent.
Finally, the informed citizens can send a signal z = {0, 1} to the public. The signal z gets through the
censorship with probability (1−x), where x is the level of censorship. If the public observes the signal z = 0
from the opposition, it knows for sure that the dictator is incompetent. If the public observes the absence
of a negative signal from the opposition (we denote this outcome as z = 1), it needs to infer whether this
is because the signal was censored (probability x), or because the true state is θ = 1, or because nobody
wanted to join the opposition (α = 1) as all the informed citizens were co-opted.
3.5 Payoffs
3.5.1 Dictator’s payoff
The dictator minimizes the probability of regime change. He does not benefit from higher GDP directly,
just through increased resources to buy support and fund propaganda and censorship.
3.5.2 Citizens’ payoff
The public maximizes current consumption, C, plus expected future consumption. Future consumption is
either δθ, if the current dictator stays, or δ
(
θ¯ −K), if the regime is changed. Here, δ is the discounted
payoff of having a competent (rather than incompetent) dictator in the future. If the regime is changed, the
new dictator is drawn from the same distribution; hence the expected quality is θ¯. Regime change involves
a non-trivial, additional cost to citizens, K.
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The co-opted informed citizens (pro-regime elite) receive additional current consumption of r per capita.
3.6 Assumptions
We assume that X̂ and P̂ are sufficiently large relative to ∆Y that X/X̂ < 1 and P/P̂ < 1 in equilibrium.
This assumption is realistic but not innocuous. The dictator cannot fully silence the elites through censorship
while he may still fully silence them through co-optation.
To focus on more interesting cases, we also assume that K < θ¯, so that if the public knows with certainty
that the dictator is incompetent, it prefers to replace the dictator.
4 Analysis
In this Section, we solve for equilibria. Given the parameters θ¯, ξ1, ξ0, ∆Y , I, X̂, P̂ δ, and K, we find the
equilibrium strategies of the dictator (C, x, P , r), of the informed citizens (to get co-opted or to join the
opposition), and of the public (to protest or to support the regime).
All agents are rational and maximize their expected payoffs given the available information. In particular,
the informed citizens’ choice is contingent on the rewards, r, offered for loyalty.
The general public observes consumption, C, and the signals p and z. If at least one of these two signals
is low (p = 0 or z = 0), the public knows with certainty that the dictator is incompetent and protests.
If both signals are high p = z = 1, then the decision depends on the consumption level, C: the public
protests if consumption is low and supports the regime if consumption is high. Therefore, its strategy is
fully described by the consumption threshold C∗ such that the public supports the regime if and only if it
observes p = z = 1 and C ≥ C∗.
We first describe the best response functions of the three players and then solve for the equilibria.
4.1 Players’ best response strategies
4.1.1 Public’s choice
The general public maximizes
UP = C + δmax
{
E(θ|C, p, z); θ¯ −K} .
where E(θ|C, p, z) is the expected value of θ given the public’s inference of the equilibrium strategies of
other players and the observed values of C, p, z. Therefore, the public chooses C∗ as the lowest level of
consumption that satisfies
E(θ|C∗, p = z = 1) ≥ θ¯ −K. (2)
The public does not protest if and only if C ≥ C∗ and p = z = 1.
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4.1.2 Informed citizens’ choice
The informed citizens choose whether to join the opposition or to get coopted. They make decisions given
the strategies of the dictator and of the general public. They infer the probability of the regime surviving
as a function of the size of the pro-regime elite and of the opposition, Π(α). The latter is a monotonically
increasing function Π′(α) > 0: the fewer people are in the opposition, the less likely is the opposition signal
to reach the public, and (for a given realization of Y and the dictator’s choice of propaganda, P , censorship,
x, and rewards, r) the less likely is the public to overthrow the dictator.
If an informed citizen of mass dα accepts to be co-opted, she gets:7
UC = C + rdα+ Π(α+ dα)δθ + (1−Π(α+ dα))δ(θ¯ −K).
If she joins the opposition, she gets:
UO = C + Π(α)δθ + (1−Π(α))δ(θ¯ −K).
The trade-off is straightforward. By joining the opposition, the informed citizen decreases the odds of the
incumbent staying in power—but loses the reward, r. The returns to regime change are: δ
(
θ − (θ¯ −K)).
Therefore, an informed citizen joins the opposition if and only if r < δΠ′(α)
[
(θ¯ −K)− θ]. It is immedi-
ately clear that if the true type is high θ = 1, the right hand side is negative and nobody wants to join the
opposition. A competent dictator does not need to offer any rewards.
If the dictator is incompetent (θ = 0), then all the informed public joins the opposition if and only if the
co-optation rewards are sufficiently low: r < r∗. Here
r∗ ≡ δΠ′(α)(θ¯ −K). (3)
Therefore, if the dictator is incompetent,
α(r) = 1{r ≥ r∗}.
4.1.3 Dictator’s choice: censorship, rewards, propaganda
The dictator learns his type, θ, observes Y and chooses the strategies: censorship (x), rewards (r), and
propaganda (P ). He maximizes his probability of staying in power, pi. Given the decisions made by the
dictator (r, x, and P ), the expected probability of staying in power depends on the type of the dictator. We
will consider the competent and incompetent dictator separately.
7As we show later, in equilibrium Π(α) is continuous and differentiable.
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4.1.3.1 Solving the competent dictator’s problem
If the dictator is competent, there is no opposition in equilibrium: β = 0. A competent dictator therefore
never uses rewards, censorship or propaganda: P = R = X = 0. For him, the propaganda signal is p = 1
with probability 1 and consumption is C = C1(Y ) ≡ Y . The probability of staying in power is therefore
pi1 = 1{Y ≥ C∗}. (4)
4.1.3.2 Solving the incompetent dictator’s problem
If the dictator is incompetent, the probability of staying in power is:8
pi0 = [1− (1− x)(1− α(r))] Λ(P )1{C ≥ C∗} (5)
Indeed, the probability of z = 1 is 1− (1− x)(1− α(r)), and the probability of p = 1 is Λ(P ).
Now consider the incompetent dictator’s optimization problem. We will maximize (5) in two steps. First,
the dictator will choose the level of consumption C = C0(Y ) and therefore the total budget, B = Y −C0(Y ),
for propaganda, censorship and rewards. Second, given the choice of consumption and budget, B, he will
choose the x, P , and r that maximize the probability, ρ, of p = z = 1 as a function of the budget:
ρ(B) = max
X+R+P≤B
[1− (1− x)(1− α(r))]Λ(P ). (6)
4.1.3.3 Incompetent dictator’s strategies given the choice of consumption
The dictator solves (6) taking into account R = α(r)rI and X = X̂(1− α(r)) min{x, 1}.
The choice of rewards for co-optation is binary: either (i) high rewards r = r∗ (and R = R∗ ≡ r∗I), or
(ii) no rewards r = 0 (and R = 0). Indeed, the rewards 0 < r < r∗ are suboptimal for the dictator relative
to r = 0—they do not reduce the number of opposition activists but are costly. The rewards r > r∗ are also
suboptimal for the same reason.
The dictator can choose high rewards only if R∗ ≤ B. In this case, he spends R = R∗; censorship is
useless (as there is no opposition), so all remaining resources are spent on propaganda: P = B − R∗. The
probability of p = z = 1 is:
ρ(B) = Λ(B −R∗) = B −R
∗
P̂
.
If the dictator chooses not to coopt the elites (r = 0), he solves:
max
X+P=B
X
X̂
P
P̂
. (7)
8Notice that the probability of survival is a continuous, monotonic and differentiable function of α. Therefore Π′(α) (which
is part of expression (3)) is well-defined.
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The solution is P = X = B2 . and the probability of p = z = 1 is:
ρ(B) =
B2
4P̂ X̂
.
The analysis implies:
ρ(B) = max
{
B −R∗
P̂
;
B2
4P̂ X̂
}
. (8)
Therefore the regime with co-optation is chosen if and only if R∗ is sufficiently low:
R∗ < B
(
1− B
4X̂
)
. (9)
4.1.3.4 Incompetent dictator’s choice of consumption
In equilibrium, the choice of consumption C0(Y ) should solve:
C0(Y ) = arg max
C
ρ(Y − C)1{C ≥ C∗} (10)
Since ρ(B) is strictly increasing in C, the dictator will always choose C = C∗ and B = Y − C∗.
4.2 Equilibria
As the competent dictator always sets C = Y , it is easy to show that there can be two kinds of equilibria.
First, C∗ = Y L, and the competent dictator always stays in power. The incompetent dictator is over-
thrown if Y = Y L. However, if Y = Y H he stays in power and spends B = Y H − Y L = ∆Y on rewards,
censorship and propaganda and therefore achieves a non-trivial probability of p = z = 1.
Second, C∗ = Y H , and the competent dictator only stays in power if Y = Y H ; the incompetent dictator
is overthrown with probability 1.
Can there be equilibria with C∗ < Y L? This is impossible as the public knows that if it observes C < Y L,
the dictator must be incompetent. So it makes sense to replace this dictator with probability 1.
Similarly, there cannot be equilibria with C∗ ∈ (Y L, Y H). In this case, if the public observes such a C∗
and p = z = 1, it knows with certainty that the dictator is incompetent (and lucky).
4.2.1 Equilibrium with C∗ = Y H
The equilibrium with C∗ = Y H exists whenever the inferred quality of a dictator with C = Y L is below the
potential alternative θ¯ −K.
Proposition 1. The equilibrium with C∗ = Y H exists if and only if
∆Y ≥ P̂
(
1
θ¯ −K − 1
)
θ¯
1− θ¯
1− ξ1
ξ0
. (11)
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In equilibrium, none of the informed citizens joins the opposition, the co-optation rewards are infinitesimal,
there is no censorship, and the incompetent dictator with Y = Y H spends ∆Y on propaganda.
In this equilibrium, the incompetent dictator survives with probability 0 while the competent dictator
survives with probability ξ1. The intuition for the structure of equilibria is as follows: when the public
observes p = z = 1 and C = Y L, it understands that it is very likely that the dictator is incompetent and is
spending a great deal of resources (∆Y , which must be sufficiently large) on propaganda. Notice that there
is no opposition: the informed citizens, understanding that the dictator will be overthrown anyway, accept
to be coopted even if the rewards are close to zero. Given that there is full co-optation, the dictator spends
nothing on censorship. Finally, as the total co-optation rewards are trivial, the dictator spends all of ∆Y on
propaganda.
4.2.2 Equilibrium with C∗ = Y L
In this equilibrium, the competent dictator always survives, while the incompetent dictator only survives if
Y = Y H . In the latter case, he spends ∆Y on propaganda, censorship and co-optation.
The properties of this equilibrium depend critically on the relative costs of co-optation and propaganda,
which is captured by the following parameter:
a ≡ δ(θ¯ −K)I
P̂
. (12)
The co-optation rewards are endogenous in equilibrium; one of their key determinants is the informed citizens’
long-term cost of not revealing the dictator’s incompetence. There are I informed citizens, and each knows
that replacing an incompetent dictator would improve her own welfare by δ(θ¯ −K). Therefore, δ(θ¯ −K)I
is the opportunity cost for the informed citizens of remaining silent—which will be the minimum reward
they will require for co-optation. The denominator P̂ is how much it costs the incompetent dictator to
generate a positive propaganda signal with probability 1; in other words, raising the probability of p = 1 by
1 percentage point costs the dictator 0.01P̂ .
In this equilibrium, the general public should believe that the average type of the dictator with C =
C∗ = Y L and p = z = 1 is weakly better than regime change:
E(θ|C = Y L, p = z = 1) = θ¯(1− ξ1)
θ¯(1− ξ1) + (1− θ¯)ξ0ρ(∆Y )
≥ θ¯ −K. (13)
Proposition 2. The equilibrium with C∗ = Y L exists only if ∆Y is sufficiently small
∆Y < 4X̂ max
{
1
a+ 1
,
a
2 − 1
a− 1
}
(14)
There can be two kinds of stable equilibria :
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If ∆Y < 4X̂ 1a+1 and
∆Y ≤ (1 + a)P̂
(
1
θ¯ −K − 1
)
θ¯
1− θ¯
1− ξ1
ξ0
. (15)
then there is an equilibrium with coopted elites: α = 1. In this equilibrium, the dictator uses co-optation
and propaganda, but not censorship. The probability of survival is:
ρ(∆Y ) =
∆Y
P̂ (1 + a)
(16)
If a > 2 and ∆Y < 4X̂
a
2−1
a−1 and
∆Y ≤
√
4P̂ X̂
(
1
θ¯ −K − 1
)
θ¯
1− θ¯
1− ξ1
ξ0
, (17)
there is an equilibrium with censorship in which all informed citizens join the opposition: α = 0. In
this equilibrium, the dictator uses censorship and propaganda, but not co-optation. The probability of
survival is:
ρ(∆Y ) =
(∆Y )2
4P̂ X̂
(18)
Equilibria with C∗ = Y L only exist if ∆Y is sufficiently small. Indeed, if ∆Y is large, the public knows
that the incompetent dictator can spend substantial resources for assuring p = z = 1. Hence observing
p = z = 1 and C = C∗, citizens still decide to protest.
Multiple equilibria. If a > 2 and if ∆Y is sufficiently small (satisfying both (14), (15) and (17)), then
we have two stable equilibria — one with propaganda and co-optation (α = 1) and one with propaganda and
censorship (α = 0). Comparing (16) and (18) we find that whenever both equilibria exist, the probability of
survival is higher in the equilibrium with co-optation.
Figure 1 presents the structure of equilibria under different values of parameters (if conditions (15) and
(17) are not binding—e.g. if (1− ξ0)/ξ1 is very high).
These equilibria (where C∗ = Y L) can also co-exist with the equilibrium with C∗ = Y H (indeed, for some
parameter values both conditions (11) and (15) are satisfied). In the latter equilibria, the public, observing
a positive signal p = z = 1 and low consumption, infers that the expected quality of the dictator is too low
and protests. As the informed citizens understand that the dictator will be removed anyway, they know that
their information will have no impact and are therefore happy to be coopted even if rewards are low. Thus,
achieving the outcome with p = z = 1 and C∗ = Y L is relatively cheap for the dictator. So the public’s
inference is justified. For the same parameter values, there may exist an equilibrium with C∗ = Y L where
informed citizens do have an impact on the dictator’s survival probability; in this case, coopting them is
costly. Hence, observing the outcome p = z = 1 and C∗ = Y L, the public infers that the expected type of
the dictator is relatively high.
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Figure 1: Equilibria.
4.3 Discussion of the results
The previous analysis yields four main results.
First, if economic volatility (the difference between good and bad economic states, ∆Y ) is not very high,
the incompetent dictator can survive in equilibrium. The logic is as follows. If ∆Y is low, that means that
an incompetent dictator who is lucky enough to experience a good economic outcome (Y = Y H) will have
only a small amount of extra resources, ∆Y , to spend on propaganda, censorship, and co-optation. As a
result, the messages received by the public should be relatively accurate. Thus, if the public does receive
the positive signals p = z = 1, it will tend to believe them and think the incumbent is competent, even if
consumption is low: C = Y L.
However, if volatility is high, then no equilibrium with C = Y L exists and the incompetent dictator is
overthrown. The impact of economic volatility is especially important in the dynamic setting (see section
5.2): we show that when volatility is low, the dictator is less likely to survive the initial period; but, if he
does, he is then more likely to remain in power for a long time.
This result may also be interpreted in a cross-sectional sense. If the public notices that other comparable
countries are doing much better (∆Y is high), they infer that their dictator may well have diverted a lot of
resources (∆Y ) into propaganda, censorship, and co-optation. As a result, they stop believing the positive
signals, conclude that the dictator is probably bad, and take to the streets to protest.
The second result is the multiplicity of equilibria. If ∆Y is small there is always an equilibrium with
co-optation, in which the elite agrees to stay silent in return for rewards. For some parameters, there is also
an equilibrium with censorship, in which all informed citizens join the opposition but the dictator attempts
to block their media communications.
The multiplicity of equilibria is driven by the ‘fiscal externality’ of the informed elites. Consider the
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equilibrium with co-optation α = 1. Every informed citizen is happy to stay in the pro-regime camp,
receiving r∗ for not joining the opposition. But now imagine that some informed citizens (β˜ > 0) join the
opposition. In this case, the dictator spends r∗β˜ less on rewards and reallocates the money to propaganda
and censorship, increasing x and P . How does that change the returns to joining the opposition for the
remaining 1− β˜ members of the elite? These returns are related to Π′(α), which in turn is proportional to
(1− x)P : the payoff to joining the opposition decreases in censorship and increases in propaganda.
Thus, the defection of some informed citizens has two opposite effects. On the one hand, the increase
in censorship reduces the odds that an anti-regime message will get through. This lowers the payoff to
joining the opposition. On the other hand, the increase in propaganda makes it less likely the general public
will learn of the dictator’s incompetence—and thus all the more important for informed citizens to try to
communicate it. This raises the payoff to joining the opposition. Which effect dominates will depend on the
parameters. If the former effect is stronger, no additional members of the elite defect, and the co-optation
equilibrium holds. But if the latter effect dominates, then the initial departures set off a spiral of defections,
ending in the equilibrium with censorship and no co-optation.
The third result concerns how the dictator’s various instruments interact. As seen in (5), censorship and
co-optation of the elite are substitutes, while propaganda is complementary to both of them. Returns to
censorship and co-optation increase with propaganda. But higher spending on censorship decreases incentives
for co-optation. These interactions emerge endogenously due to the public’s statistical inference based on
the information it receives.
Finally, we see that whenever both the equilibrium with co-optation and that with censorship exist, the
dictator’s survival probability is always higher in the first. This result may be driven by the specific linear
forms selected for the propaganda and censorship cost functions (and by the assumption that X̂ and P̂ are
sufficiently large). We chose linear technologies here for simplicity and to explore how non-linearities can
emerge simply due to the properties of statistical inference. Of course, in reality there may be increasing or
decreasing returns to scale in propaganda and censorship—although we lack strong intuitions about which
way these would go–and such nonlinearities could alter the relative survival odds in the different equilibria.
But the multiplicity of equilibria is a more robust finding, and one that suggests a novel insight. A dictator
can get stuck in an inferior yet stable equilibrium, relying on a relatively ineffective technique to stay in
power.
5 Comparative statics and extensions
5.1 Comparative statics
How do the exogenous parameters affect the dictator’s survival probability? While the model has nine
parameters (∆Y , θ¯, K, I, δ, P̂ , X̂, ξ0 and ξ1), the structure and existence of equilibria depends on just two
combinations of them: a = δ(θ¯−K)I
P̂
and ∆Y
4X̂
.
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The parameter ∆Y is the ex ante economic volatility. From (16) and (18), we see that the dictator’s
survival probability in both the possible equilibria, ρ(∆Y ), increases in ∆Y (although this is not necessarily
true in a multi-period model, see Section 5.2). The reason is simple: the higher is ∆Y , the more resources an
incompetent dictator can spend on censorship, co-optation and propaganda in a given period when Y = Y H .
Not surprisingly, this translates into a higher probability of survival—as long as the equilibrium exists.
Parameter a captures the cost of co-optation relative to the cost of propaganda. If a increases then the
equilibrium with censorship is more likely to exist, while the equilibrium with co-optation is less likely to
exist. (This can be seen as we shift the curves in Figure 1 in response to change in a; indeed 11+a decreases
in a and
a
2−1
a−1 increases in a).
If X̂ increases then both equilibria are more likely to exist—the public understands that censorship is
not cost-effective so a good signal, if received, is more likely to be true. If the censorship equilibrium holds,
higher X̂ reduces the dictator’s survival odds (see 18): his censorship becomes less effective. But if the
censorship cost rises too high, this equilibrium no longer exists and instead the equlibrium with co-optation
will hold. Recall that in the co-optation equilibrium, the dictator’s survival probability is always higher.
Paradoxically, an incompetent dictator is better off if he has an extremely ineffective apparatus of censorship.
High censorship costs serve as a commitment device, allowing the dictator to achieve an equilibrium that he
prefers.
If the alternative regime is good and revolution is not too costly (high (θ¯ − K)), then the equilibrium
with censorship is more likely and that with co-optation less likely. The intuition is straightforward: for
members of the elite, the returns to removing the incompetent dictator are high, and so to silence them with
rewards is expensive. As a result, the dictator prefers to use censorship. By the same logic, if the elite cares
more about the future (higher δ), bribing it to accept an incompetent incumbent costs more, so censorship
is favored.
What happens if the cost of propaganda, P̂ , falls? Interestingly, a goes up and the equilibrium with
co-optation becomes less likely (while the equilibrium with censorship becomes more likely). The lower the
cost of propaganda, the more likely the public will get a convincing propaganda signal. This makes the
signals of the opposition more important, and renders the informed elite harder to co-opt, increasing the
odds the dictator will use censorship instead. If an external enemy threatens the state’s security, this may
help the incumbent to dodge blame for poor economic performance, rendering his propaganda claims more
believable. If so, the equilibrium with co-optation could disappear, leaving only that with censorship.
One consequence of economic modernization is to broaden the informed elite, increasing I. In the cur-
rent setting, this makes co-opting the elite more expensive, and thus favors the equilibrium with censorship.
However, it may be more intuitive to suppose that the cost of censorship, X̂, rather than remaining fixed,
also increases with I. If, for instance, X̂ is proportional to I, it is easy to check that an increase in I makes
both equilibria less likely to exist. Indeed, higher I raises the costs of both co-opting and censoring. Since
propaganda cannot substitute for censorship and rewards (propaganda is a complement rather than a substi-
tute for both), incompetent dictators face more problems whatever they do. As suggested by “modernization
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theory,” broader access to information (or education) renders dictatorships less likely to survive.
5.2 Dynamics
We consider here a multi-period version of the model. We assume that the economic and informational
environment does not change over time. The only state variable that does evolve over time, t, is the public’s
belief, θ˜t, regarding the public’s beliefs about the type of the dictator at time t. Initially, the beliefs are
the same as in the one-period model above θ˜t = θ¯. After each period, if the dictator survives, the public
rationally updates its beliefs about him. We will assume that the alternative regime’s quality is constant
over time θ¯−K. The informed citizens do not update their views as they learn the dictator’s type precisely
in the initial period.
We first consider the dynamics of equilibrium with C∗ = Y H . In this equilibrium, if the dictator survives
after the first period, the public knows with certainty that the dictator is competent. Therefore in all future
periods θ˜t = 1 > θ¯ −K, there are no protests.
The dynamics of the equilibrium with C∗ = Y L are more complicated. With probability ξ0ρ(∆Y ) the
incompetent dictator survives. Each period, the public compares its current expectation of the dictator’s
type θ˜t with the alternative θ¯ −K. If the dictator survives, the expectation θ˜t evolves over time according
to the following Bayesian updating formula:
θ˜t+1 =
θ˜t(1− ξ1)
θ˜t(1− ξ1) + (1− θ˜t)ξ0ρ(∆Y )
= θ˜t +
θ˜t(1− θ˜t) (1− ξ1 − ξ0ρ(∆Y ))
θ˜t(1− ξ1) + (1− θ˜t)ξ0ρ(∆Y )
(19)
Therefore, θ˜t increases over time if and only if the following condition holds
ξ0ρ(∆Y ) ≤ 1− ξ1 (20)
If this is the case, the probability of survival in each particular period ξ0ρ(∆Y ) is rather low. However, if
the dictator does survive, next period the public raises its expectation regarding the type of the dictator.
If ξ0ρ(∆Y ) > 1 − ξ1, the public downgrades its beliefs every period according to (19). Eventually, at a
certain (finite) time t = t∗ the belief θ˜t falls below θ¯ − K, and the incompetent dictator is removed with
probability 1.
Proposition 3. Suppose that at time t = 0 the economy is in an equilibrium with C∗ = Y L and ρ(∆Y ).
If condition (20) holds, the incompetent dictator survives each period with probability ρ(∆Y ). His expected
lifetime in office is therefore ρ(∆Y )1−ρ(∆Y ) .
If condition (20) does not hold, then there exists such finite time t∗ > 1 that θ˜t∗ < θ¯ −K ≤ θ˜t∗−1. In the
periods t < t∗, the incompetent dictator survives each period with probability ρ(∆Y ), and at the period
t = t∗ he is removed with probability 1. His expected lifetime is ρ(∆Y )1−ρ(∆Y )
(
1− [ρ(∆Y )]t∗
)
.
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The distinction between these two cases is especially interesting given that ρ(∆Y ) is different in the
equilibria with co-optation and censorship. For the same values of parameters, there may co-exist two
equilibria: an equilibrium with co-optation (where ρ(∆Y ) is high) and an equilibrium with censorship (where
it is low). It may be the case that in the censorship equilibrium, condition (20) holds while in the co-optation
equilibrium, it does not. In this case, the dynamics will be as follows: in the co-optation equilibrium, the
probability of surviving in each given period is higher (conditional on a particular belief) but the beliefs
are downgraded each period and eventually the dictator is overthrown with certainty. In the censorship
equilibrium, per-period survival is less likely, but beliefs are always adjusted upwards, so this equilibrium
will continue indefinitely.
The ex ante economic volatility ∆Y is also important. If ∆Y is low, the public knows that condition (20)
holds, and a positive public signal p = z = 1 implies that the probability of the dictator being competent
is high. So if he survives for another period, his reputation improves and he is even likelier to last for
yet another period. Conversely, if ∆Y is high, the public knows that an incompetent dictator could be
spending a lot on propaganda and censorship. Hence, each period, the public downgrades the reputation
of the surviving incumbent. Eventually, this reputation sinks so low that the public protests against the
dictator even if it observes a positive signal p = z = 1 .
The binary nature of the shocks renders the dynamics simple to analyze but it also rules out any dynamic
effect of change in beliefs on the choice of consumption. In this model, consumption is always equal either
to Y H (if the dictator is competent and lucky) or to Y L. In section 6, we consider a model with continuous
economic shocks. There, an increase in θ¯ results in lower consumption in equilibrium. If the expected type
of the dictator is high, the incompetent dictator can get away with lower C. In such a setting, increases in
θ˜t—i.e. a trend towards greater competence in government—are accompanied by falling consumption.
5.3 Repressing the protesters
In the model developed above, the elite is not repressed in the literal sense of the word; it is only censored and
not rewarded (or fined) if it refuses to be coopted. Essentially, economic aspects of repression are included
into the parameter r (which reflects the difference between the material well-being of the members of the
pro-regime elite and that of the opposition activists). In Section 5.4 we also discuss extensions related to
jailing the opposition activists.
However, another important element of dictatorial rule is the repression of protests. By allocating certain
resources to the riot police and military, the dictator can increase the cost of regime change K. The potential
protesters do not observe this cost but can infer the dictator’s optimal choice.
What is the effect of adding a fourth instrument to the dictator’s repertoire? Now the dictator can choose
to reduce spending on censorship, rewards and propaganda, B = X +R+ P , and use the savings, ∆Y −B,
to increase K. The latter matters as it directly affects the parameter a, which, in turn, determines the cost
of rewards and therefore the structure of equilibria (see Figure 1).
Suppose that the dictator spends G on repressive capacity. He sets the level at the same time that he
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allocates the budgets for censorship, X, rewards, R, and propaganda, P . We will assume that the repression
technology is linear, K = G/Ĝ. We will assume that Ĝ > ∆Y/θ¯; this implies that repression is sufficiently
costly so that the dictator cannot achieve K = θ¯. This assumption is reasonable—indeed, if the dictator
could achieve θ¯−K = 0, he would always do so and would never use other instruments as the public would
never have an incentive to replace him.
We now need to reproduce the analysis of the equilibria replacing B = ∆Y with B = ∆Y −G and a with
a(G) = δI(θ¯ −G/Ĝ).
Consider first the equilibria with rewards (α = 1). This equilibrium exists if ∆Y −G < 4X̂1+a(G) . The higher
the level of repression G, the likelier this inequality is to hold. Therefore, repressions make this equilibrium
more likely to exist. However, given that it exists, the the probability of survival ρ(∆Y − G) = ∆Y−G
P̂ (1+a(G))
)
monotonically decreases with G. This is because repression is not cost-effective—it makes more sense to
spend money on rewards and propaganda.9
Therefore if the equilibrium without repression exists, the dictator does not spend anything on repres-
sions. However, if the equilibrium without repressions does not exist, the dictator is better-off spending on
repressions just enough to assure that this equilibrium exists. Suppose that a(0) < 2 and ∆Y > 4X̂1+a(0) . Then
without any repression, the equilibrium unravels and the dictator is removed from office with probability 1.
In this case, he would benefit from choosing the minimum level of repression that satisfies:
∆Y −G ≤ 4X̂
1 + δI
(
θ¯ − G
Ĝ
) . (21)
This level of repression is the smaller root of the respective quadratic equation.10 This solution always exists
(at G = 0, the left-hand side of (21) is greater than the right-hand side, while at G = ∆Y the left-hand side
is zero while the right-hand side is positive).
Given this level of repression, the dictator survives with a non-trivial probability ρ(∆Y −G) = 4X̂
P̂ (1+a(G))2
.
The intuition is simple. The dictator understands that without any investment in repressive capacity, the
elite is too costly to silence. So he uses some repression to make sure that the elite is less interested in regime
change and is therefore cheaper to bribe. This allows him to free up additional resources for propaganda
and therefore make ends meet in equilibrium.
Now consider the equilibrium with censorship (α = 0). In this equilibrium, the probability of survival
decreases in the level of repression: ρ(∆Y −G) = (∆Y−G)2
4P̂ X̂
. There are no incentives to spend on repressive
capacity in this equilibrium.
However, it may also be the case that this equilibrium does not exist without repressions. Consider the
situation where a(0) > 2 and ∆Y > 4X̂
a(0)
2 −1
a(0)−1 = 2X̂
(
1− 1a(0)−1
)
. Again, by spending certain amount of
resources on repressions, the dictator can assure that the equilibrium does exist. This level of repression is
9This result holds as the repression technology is linear. In the non-linear case, there may be a non-trivial amount of
repression in equilibrium.
10The solution is G = Ĝ
2δI
(
1 + δI
(
θ¯ + ∆Y
Ĝ
)
−
√(
1 + δI
(
θ¯ + ∆Y
Ĝ
))2 − 4δI (1 + δI (θ¯ + ∆Y
Ĝ
)
− 4X̂
Ĝ
))
.
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the minimum G that satisfies:
∆Y −G ≤ 2X̂
1− 1
δI
(
θ¯ − G
Ĝ
)
− 1
 .
This level of repression is also the smaller root of the quadratic equation.11 Unlike in the case of the
equilibrium with co-optation, the solution does not always exist. If parameters are such that the quadratic
equation has no roots, then no level of repression will assure the existence of equilibrium.
Thus, spending on repressions against the protesters cannot help to raise the probability of survival in
equilibrium. However, by raising the cost of revolution, they can assure the existence of equilibrium (in
case the equilibrium does not exist without repressions). This rationale for repression works when ∆Y is
sufficiently high. In this case, the economic decline is so large that the public does not believe the propaganda
any more; hence the dictator prefers to spend money on repression.
5.4 Other extensions
Our model assumes linear technologies for propaganda, censorship, and co-optation. In particular, there are
no non-linearities in the responses of informed citizens to the amount spent on propaganda. If the dictator
spends less on propaganda, the informed citizens understand that their opposition messages will have a lower
impact, and so the cost to co-opt them declines proportionally. This is why both equilibria with co-optation
and with censorship exist when ∆Y is small (so that spending on propaganda, P ≤ B ≤ ∆Y , is also small).
In reality, the informed citizens’ choice may be non-linear. There could be a fixed cost of getting co-
opted (due to the “moral cost of opportunism”) or a fixed cost of joining the opposition (e.g., a jail term).
A non-trivial moral cost would make the equilibrium with co-optation disappear for small ∆Y . Indeed, if
the total budget for co-optation and propaganda B = R+ P = ∆Y is small, the dictator would not be able
to afford to compensate all members of the elite for the moral cost of co-optation.
Meanwhile, a jail term for opposition activists might eliminate the equilibrium with censorship at low
values of ∆Y . In this case, as the total budget for co-optation and propaganda B = X + P = ∆Y is low,
spending on propaganda P = ∆Y/2. Therefore for each member of the informed elite the benefits from
joining opposition are low — they are are proportional to the impact on dictator’s survival probability, and
this impact is in turn proportional to the level of propaganda. Hence if ∆Y is sufficiently low, the benefits
of joining the opposition fall below the fixed cost of a jail term; therefore the equilibrium unravels.
We have implicitly assumed that the acts of both censorship and repression cannot be directly observed
by the public. Since competent incumbents never censor or repress, observing the dictator doing one of
these things would immediately reveal that the incumbent was incompetent. One might think of this as
endogenously increasing the size of I. If enough observed such behavior, it might set off a spiral of opposition
11The solution is G = Ĝ
2δI
(
−1 + δI
(
θ¯ + ∆Y−2X̂
Ĝ
)
−
√(
−1 + δI
(
θ¯ + ∆Y−2X̂
Ĝ
))2 − 4δI
Ĝ
(
−1 + δIθ¯ + 2X̂
))
.
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activism and protest. There are, indeed, various cases in which the use of excessive violence by the regime,
or the discovery of a grizzly murder for which the regime was blamed, catalyzed opposition to it rather than
intimidating the public. While it is implausible that a single act of violent repression would automatically
undermine the dictatorship, one can imagine introducing sufficient noise into the model that only a level of
violence that rose above a certain threshold would trigger a strong public reaction.
6 The impact of economic shocks
The model sketched so far allows only limited analysis of comparative statics with regard to economic shocks.
In the setting with two output levels, if the incompetent dictator’s output decreases, he is overthrown with
probability one, so his spending on propaganda, censorship, and co-optation are not relevant. In this section,
we consider a setting with a continuous distribution of economic shocks, in which such shocks can have a
non-trivial impact on co-optation, censorship and propaganda.
6.1 Setting
Let us assume that Y is distributed on [Y L, Y H ] with the density function f1(Y ) if the dictator is competent
and f0(Y ) if he is incompetent. We assume that the density is positive for all Y ∈ [Y L, Y H ] and that
there are no mass points. Higher output is more likely for the competent types and less likely for the
incompetent types; we assume that f0(Y ) is a (weakly) monotonically decreasing function and f1(Y ) is a
(weakly) monotonically increasing function.
As the informed citizens observe both the output and the type of the dictator, the game between the
dictator and the informed citizens remains the same. In this game, there is no asymmetric information.
Therefore, the structure of equilibria is similar to that in the previous model: there can be equilbria with
co-optation (α = 1) and with censorship (α = 0). We assume that equilibrium existence conditions (14)
hold so these equilibria exist. We will denote by B(Y ) the total budget for censorship, co-optation and
propaganda as a function of the output (in the model with binary output , B(Y H) = ∆Y and B(Y L) did
not matter as the dictator was overthrown anyway).
The model with continuous output has no equilibrium in pure strategies. We therefore consider equilibria
in mixed strategies. In such equilibria, the general public chooses a probability of supporting the dictator
as a function of the observed consumption level γ(C) ∈ [0, 1] (if p = z = 1). If p = 0 or z = 0, the public
knows with certainty that the dictator is incompetent and protests with probability 1.
In equilibrium, the public’s choice of γ(C) is optimal:
γ(C) = 0 if E(θ|C, p = z = 1) ≤ θ¯ −K,
0 < γ(C) < 1 if E(θ|C, p = z = 1) = θ¯ −K,
γ(C) = 1 if E(θ|C, p = z = 1) ≥ θ¯ −K.
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As in the model with binary output, it is easy to show that the competent dictator always chooses
C1(Y ) = Y .
The incompetent dictator faces the following trade-off: if he spends more on propaganda, co-optation
and censorship, this results in a higher probability of the positive signal p = z = 1 by the public, however
as this spending comes at the cost of lower consumption C, it implies lower probability of survival given the
positive signal. His choice of consumption level, C0(Y ), solves the following optimization problem:
C0(Y ) = arg max
0≤C≤Y
γ(C)ρ(Y − C). (22)
6.2 Equilibrium
Lemma 1. If the distribution density f1(·) does not have mass points, there is no equiLibrium in pure
strategies. The equilibrium in mixed strategies has the following properties:
(i) Public’s strategy γ(C) is weakly monotonic. If γ(C) < 1, it is strictly monotonic. The incompetent
dictator’s strategy C0(Y ) is also strictly monotonic.
(ii) There exists such C∗∗ ∈ (Y L, Y H ] that γ(C) = 1 for all C ≥ C∗∗;
(iii) γ(Y L) = 0;
(iv) 0 < γ(C) < 1 for all C ∈ (Y L, C∗∗).
(v) C0(Y ) is a differentiable, invertible function. In equilibrium, its first derivative equals
C ′0(Y ) =
f0(Y )ρ(Y − C0(Y ))
f1(C0(Y ))
(θ¯ −K)(1− θ¯)
(1− θ¯ +K)θ¯ . (23)
(vi) In the worst economic outcome, Y = Y L, the incompetent dictator spends all resources on consumption:
C0(Y
L) = Y L. (24)
(vii) The total spending on co-optation, censorship and propaganda B(Y ) = Y − C0(Y ) monotonically
increases with Y .
The Lemma implies that both γ(C0(Y )) and B(Y ) increase with Y ; therefore the higher the realization
of the economic shock, Y , the higher the probability of survival, γ(C0(Y ))ρ(B(Y )).
In order to find the equilibrium, we need to solve equation (23) given the initial condition (24). To
complete the description of the equlibrium, we should find γ(C) using the first-order condition from (22),
which yields the following differential equation: γ′(C0(Y )) = γ(C0(Y ))
ρ′(Y−C0(Y ))
ρ(Y−C0(Y )) . This equation determines
γ(·) up to a scalar multiplier. To find this multiplier, we need to use the boundary condition: γ(C0(Y H)) = 1.
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6.3 Comparative statics
In this section, we carry out the comparative statics analysis with regard to the parameters of the model.
We also compare the behavior of an incompetent dictator in an equilibrium with co-optation with the one
in an equilibrium with censorship.
Proposition 4. For given distributions f0(·) and f1(·), and for a given realization of the economic shock Y ,
an incompetent dictator spends more on censorship, co-optation and propaganda and less on consumption if
K increases, P̂ increases, X̂ increases (in the equilibrium with censorship), δI increases (in the equilibrium
with co-optation), or if both θ¯ and K increase, holding (θ¯ −K) constant;
The intuition for the comparative statics is straightforward. If P̂ increases, a dollar spent on propaganda
is less effective than before at rendering a false message convincing. The public therefore increases its
estimate of the incumbent’s competence by more when it receives a convincing message, p = z = 1, even
if the consumption level is somewhat lower. Understanding this, an incompetent dictator has an incentive
to provide a lower level of consumption and spend more on increasing the probability of a positive signal,
p = z = 1. Similar logic applies for the cost of censorship, X̂, (in the equilibrium with censorship), and for
the parameter δI (that determines the size of rewards in the equilibrium with co-optation). An increase in
K lowers the expected value of revolution; hence the public will accept a lower consumption level from the
incumbent.
Finally consider the impact of an increase in the expected quality of dictators, θ¯, holding the quality
of the alternative regime θ¯ − K constant. The higher is θ¯, the stronger is the public’s expectation that
the incumbent is competent, and so he can afford a lower level of consumption. This result is especially
important for the analysis of the dynamics. If the dictator is lucky enough to survive the first few periods, his
reputation, θ¯, increases, while the expected quality of the alternative, θ¯ −K, does not change. In this case,
the equilibrium trajectory involves the surviving dictator’s reputation growing over time and consumption
level declining over time.
We should emphasize that the comparative statics results in Proposition 4 are very different from those
that a naive ‘partial equilibrium’ model would produce. For example, if we did not take into account the
endogenous equilibrium inference of the public, an increase in the cost of propaganda should result in lower
spending on propaganda and higher spending on consumption. However, as the public is rational and can
decipher this logic, the ‘general equilibrium’ result is that a higher cost of propaganda results in lower
consumption and higher spending on propaganda.
Equation (23) also allows us to compare the reaction to economic shocks in equilibria with co-optation
(where ρ(Y − C0(Y )) is proportional to Y − C0(Y )) and equilibria with censorship (where ρ(Y − C0(Y ))
is proportional to (Y − C0(Y ))2). Consider two countries, with the same ex ante distributions of economic
shocks, f0(·) and f1(·). Suppose that we observe the same output Y˜ > Y L and same C˜ in both countries, but
that the first country is in the equilibrium with co-optation, while the second one is in the equilibrium with
censorship. Our theory predicts that if these countries are hit by similar economic shocks (e.g., Y declines to
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a certain level Y¯ ∈ (Y L, Y˜ )), then the first country will respond with a lower decrease in consumption (and
a greater decrease in the total budget for co-optation, censorship and propaganda) than the second country.
In other words, regimes with censorship react to negative economic shocks with a greater reallocation of
resources towards censorship, co-optation and propaganda than do regimes with co-optation.
Proposition 5. Consider an equilibrium where C0(Y˜ ) = C˜. For any Y¯ ∈ (Y L, Y˜ ), the decrease in con-
sumption, C0(Y˜ )− C0(Y¯ ), is smaller if the economy is in the equilibrium with co-optation (both before and
after the decline in Y ) than in the case in which it is in the equilibrium with censorship (both before and
after the decline in Y ).
6.4 Example
To illustrate the propositions stated above, we use a simple example. Let us assume that Y is distributed
on [0,∆Y ].12 The distribution is uniform for the bad type: f0(Y ) = 1/∆Y and has linear increasing density
for the good type f1(Y ) = 2Y/(∆Y )
2.
Let us assume that ∆Y is sufficiently small so that the equilibrium existence conditions (14) are satisfied
(indeed, in this case for all realizations of Y the budget, B(Y ) ≤ Y ≤ ∆Y , also satisfies these conditions).
We shall solve (23) for the equilibrium with co-optation (α = 1) and then for the equilibrium with
censorship (α = 0). In the equilibrium with co-optation, ρ(B) = B
P̂ (1+a)
. Using the boundary condition (24)
(which takes the form C0(0) = 0), we immediately find a solution for (23):
C0(Y ) = ξY ; γ(C) =
(
C
ξ∆Y
) ξ
1−ξ
. (25)
where ξ ∈ (0, 1) is given by
ξ =
√
1 + 8P̂ (1+a)∆Y
(1−θ¯+K)θ¯
(θ¯−K)(1−θ¯) − 1
4P̂ (1+a)
∆Y
(1−θ¯+K)θ¯
(θ¯−K)(1−θ¯)
.
The solution is therefore simple: if output decreases, the incompetent dictator proportionally decreases
total spending on co-optation and propaganda B(Y ) = (1 − ξ)Y . Moreover, as follows from the Proof of
Proposition 2, spending on co-optation and spending on propaganda also change proportionally: R(Y ) =
a
a+1 (1− ξ)Y and P (Y ) = 1a+1 (1− ξ)Y .
Now let us consider the equilibrium with censorship. In this case, ρ(B) = B
2
4P̂ X̂
. Therefore, (23) turns
into a non-linear differential equation that has no analytical solution. However, we can approximate the
solution in the neighborhood of Y = 0:
C =
√
∆Y
12P̂ X̂
(1− θ¯)(θ¯ −K)
θ¯(1− θ¯ +K) Y
3
2 + o
(
Y
3
2
)
. (26)
12The lower bound of zero is a normalization to the lowest level of GDP above which income can be diverted to propaganda,
censorship, and co-optation.
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Figure 2: Consumption, C, and spending on censorship, X, co-optation, R, and propaganda, P , as a function
of the economic shock Y .
This means that in the equilibrium with censorship, the incompetent dictator spends relatively more on
censorship and propaganda as the economy worsens: B(Y )/Y increases as Y falls to zero. In the limit Y → 0,
the share of output spent on censorship and propaganda actually reaches 100 percent: limY→0
B(Y )
Y = 1.
Conversely, as output grows, the share spent on consumption increases: C0(Y )/Y is increasing with Y . The
amounts spent on censorship and propaganda in this equilibrium are equal to each other X = P = B(Y )/2.
In proportion to total income, Y , their shares therefore also increase as output falls.
In Figure 2 we present the numerical solution and show that these properties hold for the whole range
of Y and not just in the neigborhood of Y = 0.
The example also illustrates Proposition 4. Indeed, in the equilibrium with co-optation, ξ increases in
∆Y
P̂ (1+a)
(1−θ¯)(θ¯−K)
θ¯(1−θ¯+K) . And it is easy to show, both analytically and numerically, that in the equilibrium with
censorship, for any given Y , consumption C0(Y ) increases in
∆Y
P̂ X̂
(1−θ¯)(θ¯−K)
θ¯(1−θ¯+K) .
7 Conclusions
The totalitarian tyrants of the past used mass violence, ideological indoctrination, and closed borders to
monopolize power. In a world of economic interdependence and modern communications technology, many
authoritarian leaders choose a different strategy—that of manipulating information to convince the public
that they are doing a good job. We model the tradeoffs this generates, as dictators choose from a repertoire
of techniques, and citizens exploit the signals inherent in the dictator’s actions to infer his type.
We show that, in this setup, incompetent leaders can survive by manipulating the information environ-
ment so long as economic shocks are not too large. In such equilibria, no violent repression—or at most a
very little—is needed. Over time, an incompetent leader who survives may acquire a reputation for compe-
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tence by virtue of rational Bayesian updating on the part of the public. Major economic downturns destroy
such equilibria, exposing the leader’s incompetence, and generating protests that can only be suppressed by
force.
The coordination problem of members of the informed elite leads to multiple equilibria, in one of which
the dictator focuses on co-optation and in the other of which he relies instead on censorship. Co-optation
and censorship are substitutes—both prevent the elite from publicizing an incumbent’s failures—but state
propaganda is complementary to both. The multiplicity of equilibria may explain why we observe very
different levels of censorship and of patronage in otherwise similar regimes.
We also show that a dictator focused on co-optation reacts to economic shocks differently from one who
is commited to censorship. The latter is more likely to boost propaganda and censorship in response to
an economic downturn than the former. Although we do not explicitly model the use of institutions such
as legislatures, parties, and elections, it is clear that a dictator who succeeds in convincing the public that
he is competent can enjoy the benefits of such “democratic” elements without fear of losing power. Such
institutions—which are quite compatible with a strategy of co-optation of the elite—can be used to amplify
the (accurate) perception of the dictator’s popularity.
The survival strategies we formalize are more compatible with a modernized society than totalitarian ones
or those of monarchs who rely on traditional legitimacy. Yet, we also show how modernization ultimately
undermines such informational equilibria. As education and information spread to a broader segment of the
population, it becomes harder to control how this informed elite communicates with the masses.
28
References
Acemoglu, Daron and James A. Robinson. 2006. Economic Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Barry, Ellen. 2011. “Before Voting, Russian Leaders Go to the Polls.” New York Times, August 17,
p.A1.
Boix, C., and Svolik, M. W. (2013). The Foundations of Limited Authoritarian Government: Institutions,
Commitment, and Power-Sharing in Dictatorships. The Journal of Politics, 75(02), 300-316.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2010. ”Leader survival, revolutions, and the nature of
government finance.” American Journal of Political Science 54(4): 936-950.
Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, Alastair Smith, Randolph M. Siverson, and James D. Morrow. 2003. The
Logic of Political Survival. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Dagaev, Dmitry and Lamberova, Natalia and Sobolev, Anton and Sonin, Konstantin, 2013. ”Technolog-
ical Foundations of Political Instability,” CEPR Discussion Papers 9787, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
Edmond, Chris. “Information Manipulation, Coordination, and Regime Change.” Review of Economic
Studies 2013 80: 1422-1458.
Egorov, G., Guriev, S., and Sonin, K. (2009). Why resource-poor dictators allow freer media: a theory
and evidence from panel data. American Political Science Review, 103(04), 645-668.
Egorov, G., and Sonin, K. (2011). Dictators And Their Viziers: Endogenizing The Loyalty-Competence
Trade-Off. Journal of the European Economic Association, 9(5), 903-930.
Esarey, A. 2005. Cornering the market: state strategies for controlling China’s commercial media. Asian
Perspective 29(4): 37-83.
Freedom House. 2013. Freedom on the Net: 2013, Washington, DC: Freedom House. Gandhi, Jennifer.
2008. Political Institutions under Dictatorship. New York: Cambridge University Press.
Gandhi, Jennifer and Ellen Lust-Okar. 2009. “Elections under Authoritarianism.” Annual Review of
Political Science 12: 403-22.
Geddes, Barbara. 1999. ”What do we know about democratization after twenty years?” Annual review
of political science 2(1): 115-144.
Gehlbach, Scott and Philip Keefer. 2011. “Investment Without Democracy: Ruling-Party Institutional-
ization and Credible Commitment in Autocracies.” Journal of Comparative Economics 39(2):123-139.
Hassid, Jonathan, Controlling the Chinese Media: An Uncertain Business (June, 30 2008). Univer-
sity of California, Reprinted from Asian Survey, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 414-30, 2008. Available at SSRN:
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153714
King, Gary, Jennifer Pan, and Margaret E. Roberts. 2013. ”How censorship in China allows government
criticism but silences collective expression.” American Political Science Review 107(2): 326-343.
Kricheli, Ruth, Yair Livne, and Beatriz Magaloni. 2011. “Taking to the Streets: Theory and Evidence
on Protests Under Authoritarianism.” Stanford University: unpublished.
29
Kuran, Timur. 1991. “Now Out of Never: The Element of Surprise in the East European Revolution of
1989.” World Politics, 44(1): 7-48.
Levitsky, S., and Way, L. A. 2010. Competitive authoritarianism: hybrid regimes after the cold war.
New York: Cambridge University Press.
Lohmann, Susanne. 1994. “Dynamics of Informational Cascades: The Monday Demonstrations in
Leipzig, East Germany, 1989-91”, World Politics, 47(1): 42-101.
Lorentzen, P. (2014). China’s Strategic Censorship. American Journal of Political Science, 58(2), 402-414.
McMillan, J., and Zoido, P. 2004. “How to subvert democracy: Montesinos in Peru.” Journal of Economic
Perspectives 18(4): 69-92.
Miller, M. K. (2014). Elections, information, and policy responsiveness in autocratic regimes. Compar-
ative Political Studies, 0010414014555443. - Myerson, Roger B. 2008. “The Autocrat’s Credibility Problem
and Foundations of the Constitutional State.” American Political Science Review 102(1):125-139.
Odegard, Peter H. 1935. “Propaganda and Dictatorship,” in Guy Stanton Ford, ed., Dictatorship in the
Modern World, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, pp.231-270.
Olson, Mancur. 1993. “Dictatorship, Democracy and Development.” American Political Science Review
87 (Sept.): 567-76.
Rodan, G. 1998. “The Internet and political control in Singapore.” Political Science Quarterly, 113(1):
63-89.
Svolik, Milan W. 2009. ”Power sharing and leadership dynamics in authoritarian regimes.” American
Journal of Political Science 53(2): 477-494. Svolik, Milan W. 2012. The Politics of Authoritarian Rule. New
York: Cambridge University Press.
Wintrobe, Ronald. 1990. “The Tinpot and the Totalitarian: An Economic Theory of Dictatorship.” The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 84, No. 3 (Sep.), pp. 849-872.
Wintrobe, Robert. 2007. “Dictatorship: Analytical Approaches.” In Carles Boix and Susan Stokes, eds.
Oxford Handbook of Comparative Politics. New York: Oxford University Press: ch. 16.
Roht-Arriaza, Naomi. 2005. The Pinochet Effect: Transnational Justice in the Age of Human Rights.
Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
Thorsten Beck, George Clarke, Alberto Groff, Philip Keefer, and Patrick Walsh, 2001. ”New tools in
comparative political economy: The Database of Political Institutions.” 15:1, 165-176 (September), World
Bank Economic Review.
Treisman, Daniel 2014. ”Income, Democracy, and Leader Turnover.” American Journal of Political
Science.
Ulfelder, Jay and Valentino, Benjamin, Assessing Risks of State-Sponsored Mass Killing (February 1,
2008). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1703426 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1703426
Willis, Michael J. 2014. “Evolution not Revolution? Morocco and the Arab Spring.” In Larbi Sadiki,
ed., Routledge Handbook of the Arab Spring: Rethinking Democratization, New York: Routledge, 435-450.
30
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. Let us calculate the expected value of the type of the dictator that the public
infers when observing p = z = 1 and C = Y L. This outcome is possible if the dictator is good (which
happens with probability θ¯(1− ξ1)) or if the dictator is incompetent wiht Y H and spends ∆Y on censorship,
repression and propaganda.
Let us calculate the probability of the incompetent dictator having p = z = 1 and C = Y L. The
informed citizens understand that the incompetent dictator is overthrown with probability 1. Therefore
they expect Π(α) = 0 and Π′(α) = 0. Hence r∗ = 0 and R∗ = 0 (informed citizens join pro-regime elite
even for an infinitesimal reward). Thus B˜ = 0, and the dictator does not use censorship x = 0 and spends
all his resources on propaganda P = ∆Y . Therefore ρ(∆Y ) = ∆Y/P̂ . Therefore the the probability of the
incompetent dictator having p = z = 1 and C = Y L is (1− θ¯)ξ0∆Y/P̂ .
The equilibrium exists whenever
E(θ|C = Y L, p = z = 1) = θ¯(1− ξ1)
θ¯(1− ξ1) + (1− θ¯)ξ0ρ(∆Y )
≤ θ¯ −K
which can be rewritten as (11).
Notice that which ρ(∆Y ) = ∆Y/P̂ is the maximum probability for the incompetent dictator to have
p = z = 1 and C = Y L, in this equilibrium the incompetent dictator is overthrown anyway so he is
indifferent whether to maximize this probability or to choose another strategy. However, if he spends less
on propaganda and C > Y L, this equilibrium does not exist. Also, if instead of spending ∆Y , the dictator
spends it on censorship or co-optation — and therefore may have a lower ρ(∆Y ), the condition above may not
hold and the equilibrium stops to exist. Therefore, (11) is a necessary and sufficient condition for equilibrium
with C∗ = Y H to exist. 
Proof of Proposition 2. Let us first calculate Π′(α). The expression (6) implies that the derivative of
probability of achieving p = z = 1 with regard to α is (1− x)Λ(P ). Therefore
Π′(α) = E [(1− x)Λ(P )1{C ≥ C∗}] . (27)
There can be three cases. First, ∆Y > B˜ (no opposition α = 1). In this case, x = 0, Λ(P ) = ∆Y−R
∗
P̂
.
Hence, Π′(α) = ∆Y−R
∗
P̂
.
Second, if ∆Y < B˜ (all informed join the opposition α = 0). In this case x = ∆Y/(2X̂) and Λ(P ) =
∆Y/(2P̂ ). In this case Π′(α) =
(
1− ∆Y
2X̂
)
∆Y
2P̂
.
Third, ∆Y = B˜ (the informed citizens are indifferent whether to join the opposition). In this case Π′(α)
is not defined but the equality ∆Y = B˜ is sufficient to solve for the equilibrium.
1. Equilibrium with co-optation. Let us first consider the case α = 1. In this case Π′(α) = ∆Y−R
∗
P̂
.
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Substituting r∗ = R∗/I and Π′(α) from (3), we find an equation for R∗:
R∗ = r∗I = δΠ′(α)(θ¯ −K)I = a(∆Y −R∗)
Solving for R∗ = ∆Y aa+1 and substituting into (9) we find the following condition:
a
a+1 <
(
1− ∆Y
4X̂
)
.
Therefore, this equilibrium exists only if ∆Y is sufficiently low
∆Y < 4X̂
1
1 + a
(28)
Finally, we need to check whether ρ(∆Y ) = ∆Y−R
∗
P̂
= ∆Y
P̂ (1+a)
satisfies the condition (13). This gives us
the condition (15).
2. Equilibrium with censorship and no co-optation α = 0. In this case R = 0, and Π′(α) = (1−x)P/P̂ =(
1− ∆Y
2X̂
)
∆Y
2P̂
. Hence, the equation for R∗ is
R∗ = δ(θ¯ −K)I
(
1− ∆Y
2X̂
)
∆Y
2P̂
= a∆Y
(
1
2
− ∆Y
4X̂
)
Since in this equilibrium ∆Y < B˜, the condition (9) implies that R∗ > ∆Y
(
1− ∆Y
4X̂
)
hence
a
(
1
2
− ∆Y
4X̂
)
>
(
1− ∆Y
4X̂
)
.
Since R∗ must be non-negative, the left-hand side in the inequality above must be non-negative; this also
implies that the right-hand side is also non-negative (1− ∆Y
4X̂
> 1− ∆Y
2X̂
≥ 0). Hence this equilibrium exists
only if a > 2 and if ∆Y < 4X̂
a
2−1
a−1 ,
This equilibrium exists if ρ(∆Y ) = (∆Y )
2
4P̂ X̂
satisfies the condition (13); this is the case whenever (17) holds.
3. Intermediate equilibrium α ∈ (0, 1) There is also an intermediate (unstable) equilibrium: the case
where ∆Y = B˜ which is equivalent to
R∗ = ∆Y
(
1− ∆Y
4X̂
)
. (29)
In this equilibrium, the informed citizens are indifferent between accepting or rejecting the rewards. Some
of them (α) are in the pro-regime elite and some (β) joint the opposition. The budget spent on rewards is
αR∗ so the dictator solves
max
X+P≤∆Y−αR∗;X≥0
(
1− (1− α)
(
1− X
βX̂
))
P
P̂
= max
X+P≤∆Y−αR∗;X≥0
(αX̂ +X)P
P̂ X̂
This equilibrium is unstable. If in equilibrium α informed citizens are coopted then if dα of them decide
to deviate and join the opposition, then the dictator will spend less on co-optation and more on propaganda.
This will immediately increase the informed citizens’ returns to joining opposition in equilibrium (higher level
of propaganda will increase Π′(α), so the remaining α−dα will now strictly prefer joining the opposition. 
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Proof of Lemma 1. Non-existence of equilibrium in pure strategies. Suppose there is an equilibrium in
pure strategies. In this equilibrium, if p = z = 1 the public protests with probability 1 if C < C∗ and
does not protest with probability 1 if C ≥ C∗. Then there exists a certain threshold Y ∗ such that the
incompetent dictators with Y ≥ Y ∗ choose C0(Y ) = C∗ and survive with probability ρ(Y − C∗). Indeed, if
an incompetent dictator with Y1 chooses C = C
∗, then any luckier incompetent dictator Y2 > Y1 will also
choose C = C∗ and spend the additional resources (Y2 −C∗)− (Y1 −C∗)Y2 − Y1 on censorship, co-optation
and propaganda. There is no rationale for Y2 to increase consumption — as it does not increase probability
of not being overthrown.
The competent dictators still choose C = Y ; there is no incentive for them to spend any money on
censorship, co-optation and propaganda.
Now let us calculate the expected type of the dictator given observed consumption. If the public observes
C∗ and p = z = 1, it knows that this may be the case if the dictator is good and Y = C∗ (which happens
with infinitesimal probability f1(C
∗)dY ) or the dictator is incompetent and Y ≥ Y ∗ (which happens with
probability
∫ Y H
Y ∗ ρ(Y − C∗)f0(Y )dY ). Unless there is a mass point of competent dictators at Y = C∗, the
inferred probability that the dictator is good is actually zero — and the public strictly prefers to overthrow
the dictator. Therefore this is not an equilibrium.
Properties of the equilibrium in mixed strategies.
(i) First, let us show that γ(·) is monotonically increasing function. Suppose there are two values of
consumptions C1 and C2 such that C1 < C2 but gamma(C1) > γ(C2). If this is the case, no incompetent
dictator will choose C = C2. Indeed, if a dictator chooses C2, he can do better by choosing C = C1
assuring a higher γ(C) and higher ρ (by spending additional C2 − C1 on propaganda, censorship and
co-optation). Hence, if the public observes C = C2, it knows that the dictator cannot be bad. Therefore
γ(C2) must be equal to 1. But this is impossible since gamma(C2) < γ(C1) ≤ 1.
Similarly, we can prove that γ(C1) = γ(C2) is only possible if both are equal to 1.
The fact that C0(Y ) is monotonic directly follows from the monotonic comparative statics of the
optimisation problem (22). As ρ(·) is a linear or quadratic function of Y − C (depending on whether
the equilibrium is the one with co-optation or the one with censorship, respectively), it is easy to show
that the solution of the optimizatio problem increases with Y . Moreover, if γ(C) < 1, the function
C0(Y ) strictly increases with Y .
(ii) If C = Y H and p = z = 1, the public understands that the dictator is good with probability 1 (if
dictator is incompetent, he needs to spend a non-trivial amount on propaganda to send a signal p = 1
so he cannot assure C = Y H). Therefore γ(Y H) = 1.
Let us denote C∗∗ the choice of consumption by the incompetent dictator with the highest Y = Y H ,
i.e. C∗∗ = C0(Y H). Then by definition for all C ≥ C∗∗ the public infers that the dictator is good with
probability 1 so that γ(C) must be equal to 1.
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(iii) Now we shall prove that γ(Y L) must be equal to zero? If this is not the case, then there exists certain
Y˜ > Y L so that for a bad ruler with such Y˜ it is optimal to spend Y˜ − Y L on censorship, co-optation
and propaganda. (Indeed, the incompetent dictator with Y = Y L cannot provide consumption C = Y L
and assure a positive signal p = z = 1). Let us now consider the choices of incompetent dictators with
Y ∈ (Y L, Y˜ ). Monotonicity of C0(Y ) implies that they should choose C0(Y ) ≤ Y L. If they choose
C < Y L, they are ousted with probability 1. Therefore they choose C = Y L as this choice gives a
positive probability γ(Y L)ρ(Y − Y L) to stay in office. Therefore if the public observes C = Y L and
p = z = 1 it infers the dictator may be good with Y = Y L or he may be bad with Y ∈ (Y L, Y˜ ).
Since there are no mass points, the conditional probability of the dictator being good is infinitesimal.
Therefore E(θ|C = Y L, p = z = 1) = 0, so γ(Y L) cannot be positive.
(iv) Now let us prove that there cannot be an equilibrium in which γ(C) = 0 for C > Y L. If it were the
case, there would be a certain C˜ > Y L such that γ(C) = 0 for all C ∈ [Y L, C˜] and γ(C) > 0 for C > C˜.
In this case all incompetent dictators with Y > C˜ would choose C0(Y ) > C˜ as this would give them
a positive probability to stay in office while C ≤ C˜ guarantees losing office with probability 1. Let us
now consider the choice of the incompetent dictator with Y = C˜. If he does not spend anything on
propaganda, censorship, and co-optation, then probability to achieve p = z = 1 is trivial; hence the
public observing C = C˜ and p = z = 1 knows with certainty that dictator is good. Therefore, γ(C˜)
must be equal to 1 rather than 0. Alternatively, if the incompetent dictator with Y = C˜ does spend a
non-trivial amount B(C˜) > 0 on propaganda, censorship, and co-optation then C0(C˜) < C˜. But this
implies that there is no incompetent dictator that chooses consumption C ∈ (C0(C˜), C˜). Therefore if
the public observes C in the range (C˜−B(C˜), C˜), the public infers that dictator must be good. Hence,
γ(C) for C ∈ (C˜ − B(C˜), C˜) must be equal to 1 rather than 0. We arrive at a contradiction which
proves that γ(C) = 0 only for C = Y L.
(v) We have already proven in (i) that incompetent dictators with different economic shocks cannot choose
the same consumption. Therefore, the function C0(Y ) is invertible, and we can introduce the inverse
function y(C) = C−10 (C) (in other words, Y = y(C) if and only if C = C0(Y )).
Let us now calculate the E(θ|C, p = z = 1) given the equilibrium beliefs of the general public about
fθ(Y ) and C0(Y ). Suppose that the public observes consumption to be in the interval between C and
C + dC. This can be the case if the dictator is good and has output Y ∈ [Y, Y + dY ]; or it can be the
case if the dictator is incompetent and the output is Y ∈ [y(C), y(C) + y′(C)dC]. Therefore
E(θ|C, p = z = 1) = θ¯f1(C)
θ¯f1(C) + (1− θ¯)f0(y(C))ρ(y(C)− C)y′(C)
=
1
1 + 1−θ¯
θ¯
f0(y(C))y′(C)
f1(C)
ρ(y(C)− C)
(30)
As E(θ|C, p = z = 1) = θ¯ −K for all C ∈ [Y L, C∗∗], we can obtain a differential equation for y(C):
y′(C) =
f1(C)
f0(y(C))ρ(y(C)− C)
(1− θ¯ +K)θ¯
(θ¯ −K)(1− θ¯) .
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This equation implies that y′(C) is continuous which implies that C0(Y ) is also differentiable and
its derivative is continuous. Using the inverse function theorem y′(C)C ′0(y(C)) = 1, we can use the
differential equation for y(C) above to obtain the differential equation (23).
(vi) Suppose y(Y L) = Y˜ > Y L, this would be a suboptimal choice for the incompetent dictator with Y = Y˜ .
By choosing consumption C = Y L, he got a zero probability to stay in power while he could do better
by choosing certain C ∈ (Y L, Y˜ ).
(vii) In order to prove that B(Y ) never decreases with Y , we need to prove that C ′0(Y ) = 1−B′(Y ) cannot
be above. As C0(Y
L) = Y L, in the neighborhood of Y = Y L the difference B(Y ) = Y −C0(Y ) cannot
decrease with Y , therefore C ′0(Y ) < 1 for all Y sufficiently close to Y
L.
Therefore if C ′0(Y ) at least for some Y , there must exist Y such that C
′
0(Y ) increases with Y and
C ′0(Y ) > 1. However, this is not possible. Indeed, for such Y the left-hand side of (23) increases in
Y while the right-hand side decreases with Y (as B(Y ) is falling for such Y , the term ρ(Y − C0(Y ) is
decreasing, also, f0(Y ) is decreasing by definition, and f1(C0(Y )) is decreasing well).
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Proof of Proposition 4. Let us consider a differential equation
C ′0(Y ) = MΦ(Y,C0(Y )) (31)
where M is a constant and Φ(·) is a continuous function. Then a solution of this differential equation on
Y ∈ [Y L, Y H ] with the initial condition (24) has the following comparative statics property: if M˜ > M then
for each Y > Y H the respective solution C˜
(
0Y ) is above the original solution C
(
0Y ). Indeed, the equation
(31) and the initial condition (24) jointly imply that C˜
(
0Y ) > C
(
0Y ) at least in some neighborhood of Y
L.
Suppose that there exist Y > Y L such that C˜
(
0Y ) = C
(
0Y ). Let us denote Y˘ the intersection point of C˜
(
0Y )
and C
(
0Y ) which is closest to Y
L. Since C˜
(
0Y ) > C
(
0Y ) for all Y ∈ (Y˜ , Y˘ ), we should have C˜ ′0(Y˘ ) < C ′0(Y˘ ).
But since C˜0(Y˘ ) = C0(Y˘ ) (31) and M˜ > M imply that C˜
′
0(Y˘ ) > C
′
0(Y˘ ).
Therefore for each Y , an increase in M implies an increase in C0(Y ) and decrease in B(Y ) = Y −C0(Y ).
In the equilibrium with co-optation, we can substitute (16) into (23):
C ′0(Y ) =
(θ¯ −K)(1− θ¯)
(P̂ + δ(θ¯ −K)I)(1− θ¯ +K)θ¯
f0(Y )(Y − C0(Y ))
f1(C0(Y ))
.
which has the form (31) for M = (θ¯−K)(1−θ¯)
(P̂+δ(θ¯−K)I)(1−θ¯+K)θ¯ .
Similarly, (18) and (23) imply the equation (31) for the equilibria with censorship:
C ′0(Y ) =
(θ¯ −K)(1− θ¯)
4P̂ X̂(1− θ¯ +K)θ¯
f0(Y )(Y − C0(Y ))2
f1(C0(Y ))
.
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In this case M = (θ¯−K)(1−θ¯)
4P̂ X̂(1−θ¯+K)θ¯ .
Differentiating the expressions for M with regard to parameters of the model, we obtain the comparative
statics results.
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Proof of Proposition 5. The equation (23) immediately implies that if both countries have the same Y
and C then ratio of slopes of C0(Y ) for the two countries is as follows
C
(2)′
0 (Y )
C
(1)′
0 (Y )
=
Y − C
M
(32)
where M is a constant depending on parameters of propaganda, censorship, and distributions of economic
shocks.
Let us first consider Y = Y L. At this level of output the two countries have the same consumption
C
(1)
0 (Y
L) = C
(2)
0 (Y
L) = Y L. Therefore (32) implies that in the vicinity of Y = Y L the slope C
(2)′
0 (Y ) is
below C
(1)′
0 (Y ). Therefore there exists a range of Y for which C
(2)
0 (Y ) < C
(1)
0 (Y ).
Suppose that at some Y the two curves C
(1)
0 (Y ) and C
(2)
0 (Y ) intersect. Let us denote Y˜ the intersection
point closest to Y L. At this point C
(1)
0 (Y ) intersects C
(2)
0 (Y ) from the above, so we should have C
(1)′
0 (Y˜ ) <
C
(2)′
0 (Y˜ ). Using (32) we find that B˜ > M .
Let us now prove that cannot be another intersection. Indeed, suppose that there exist other intersection
points. Let us denote Y˘ the intersection point which is closest to Y˜ . As C
(2)
0 (Y ) > C
(1)
0 (Y ) for all Y ∈ (Y˜ , Y˘ ),
we should have C
(1)′
0 (Y˘ ) > C
(2)′
0 (Y˘ ). This implies B˘ < M < B˜. But this contradicts monotonicity of B(Y ).
Therefore there can only be one intersection point Y˜ . To the left of this intersection point Y ∈ (Y L, y˜),
the first country has a higher consumption C and lower budget B for propaganda, censorship and co-optation
than the second country. To the right of this intersection point Y ∈ (Y˜ , Y H), the second country spends
more on consumption and less on for propaganda, censorship and co-optation than the first country.
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